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The focus of tfns research is on the impact of the diffusion 
of mnovattons m integrated circuit technology on the market 
structure of that mdustry and the implications of firm strategy 
for both further innovation and market structure change. The 
study exammes the effects of sustained product mnovatton 
over a hfteen-year-period in the DRAM segment of the m- 
tegrated ctrcutt Industry. Assessments are made on first mover 
advantages, shape of the dtffuston curve, and resource needs in 
a market characterized by an mcreasingly complex technology. 
Compartsons are made along the dtmenstons of number of 
firma m the market, continuity of the hrms and market con- 
centration. 
A number of researchers have argued that tech- 
nological change is the primary driving force be- 
hind the evolution of market structure i&33,34,38]. 
Much of the research on the impact of sustained 
technological innovation on industry structure has 
taken either a macroeconomic approach [21a] or 
an historical case approach [38]. Building on this 
previous work, an evolutionary framework has 
emerged which now offers several conceptual pro- 
positions concerning how technolo~~al innovation 
effects market development [8,33,34,43,44]. The 
research presented in this paper does not attempt 
to test the evolutionary framework in its entirety, 
but it will empirically examine several proposi- 
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tions put forth by these researchers concerning 
industrial structure and diffusion of technology. 
Research approach 
The evolutionary framework suggests that tech- 
nologies follow a trajectory of development 
[32,34,43,44]. Each trajectory marks a path of sus- 
tained technological innovation. As technologies 
progress along their trajectory of development, 
they become more complicated and require more 
resources to continue development [8,32]. This 
maturation process challenges organizations on 
both economic and engineering dimensions. Those 
organizations that are able to provide the necess- 
ary resources to meet each challenge will be better 
able of continuing to innovate. 
In the evolutionary economic framework, radi- 
cal and product innovation are considered critical 
to industrial structure [32,34]. Radical innovations 
in technology result in the creation of entirely new 
industries, such as occurred with the inventions of 
the jet aircraft or the transistor [9]. This type of 
innovation is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Product innovation is related to the improvement 
in capacity of products to fulfil certain functions 
and trace out a path or trajectory of a technology 
[8,32]. Sustained innovation, for purposes of this 
paper, is when a number of improvements in a 
product occurs sequentially and results in new 
generations of the product which have enhanced 
performance over previous generations of the 
product. This movement from one product genera- 
tion to another, is responsible for changes in in- 
dustrial structure which result in the evolution of 
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an industry through a number of stages [31,34,44]. 
For purposes of this paper, then, innovation repre- 
sents a change in technology which is manifested 
in the development of new products. 
Components of technologv 
In order to better understand how product in- 
novation in a technology effects elements of in- 
dustrial structure such as firm size and market 
concentration, it is important to explore what is 
meant by technology in greater detail. Technology 
represents the capability of the firm to confront 
uncertainty [40]. As noted above, from a firm’s 
strategic perspective. technology is embodied in 
products. Clark [8] points out that products reflect 
the design and productive capabilities of firms. 
These design and productive capabilities can be 
viewed as composed of two stocks. one being a 
stock of capital and the other a stock of knowl- 
edge. The “stock of capital”, is the physical/ 
material component of technology, most often em- 
bodied in laboratories and capital equipment. The 
“stock of knowledge” is most often embodied in 
people and procedures needed to generate techno- 
logical innovation. For purposes of this research, 
additions to these two stocks will be termed 
“financial” and “informational” resources, re- 
spectively. Changes in the stock variables, repre- 
sented by increases in the financial and informa- 
tion resources in a technology are necessary for 
innovation. This view of technological innovation 
is consistent with that of Nelson and Winter [32] 
and Sahal [43]. 
Organizational reactions to the changes in re- 
source needs, resulting from the imperative of 
sustained product innovation have direct conse- 
quences for firm size and industrial structure. 
Firms that are successful in innovating gain eco- 
nomic rents from producing products that compe- 
titors do not [16.48]. As a result, the innovative 
firm grows at the expense of the non-innovative 
firms. These firms should be better able to acquire 
the resources necessary to continue innovation 
and. as a result, large firms should be the inno- 
vators. 
As industries have become increasingly global 
in competitive scope an important development in 
this argument concerning firm size and innovati- 
veness has emerged [15.18]. Ferguson [15] has 
argued that large firms will be more innovative in 
global industries because these firms will be able 
to provide the resources necessary for innovation. 
Gilder [18] has argued that small firms are more 
able to innovate because these firms are not 
burdened by the “bureaucratic inertia” of large 
firms and are more adaptive to changes in markets. 
Success of large versus small firms in innovat- 
ing has a direct impact on industrial structure in 
that the success of large firms would increase the 
likelihood that markets would become more con- 
centrated. Changes in industrial structure, such as 
firm size or market concentration. are important 
in that these will effect the diffusion of innova- 
tions [34]. As a technology matures. barriers to 
entry become great and fewer firms enter. result- 
ing in a decreasing number of firms in the in- 
dustry [31.34]. Firms that have already entered the 
industry as the prime movers in a technology are 
most likely to continue in the industry. Hence, 
both the number of firms and the continuity of 
the firms in an industry become constant or de- 
crease as the technology matures. 
To summarize. the evolutionary economic 
framework argues that continued product innova- 
tion requires increasing resources. This favors large 
firms and results in changes in industrial struc- 
ture. Changes in industrial structure. as reflected 
in increases in firm size and market concentration 
levels should inhibit diffusion of innovation as 
reflected in the number of firms adopting an in- 
novation and the continuity of innovating firms. 
Propositions 
Using the evolutionary economic framework 
described above as a base, several propositions 
will be derived that can be empirically tested. The 
first of these propositions is concerned with the 
changes in the resources needed as a technology 
undergoes a series of innovations, or sustained 
innovation. The second and third propositions are 
concerned with the impact of sustained innovation 
on firm size and market structure. The fourth and 
fifth are concerned with the impact of sustained 
innovation on diffusion. 
Proposition One: As a technology undergoes sus- 
tained innovations, the level of informational and 
financial resources needed to continue innovation 
should increase. 
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Proposrtion Two: As a technology undergoes sus- 
tained innovation. the size of the firms entering 
first should increase. 
Proposrtlon Three: As a technology undergoes sus- 
tained innovation. the concentration of the in- 
dustry should increase. 
Proposition Four: As a technology undergoes sus- 
tained innovation, the maximum number of firms 
adopting the innovation should decrease. 
Proposition Five: As a technology undergoes sus- 
tained innovation, the continuity of firms between 
innovations should increase. 
Methodology 
The above propositions were tested by examin- 
ing the impact of technological innovation in the 
Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) seg- 
ment of the integrated circuit (IC) industry for the 
years 1974 to 1989. The DRAM segment was 
chosen because innovations in this device are cru- 
cial to developing the design and production tech- 
nologies for all other integrated circuit devices 
[25]. It is also a technology where a number of 
product innovations have been generated over a 
period of years and as such has undergone sus- 
tained innovation. Consequently. the DRAM de- 
vice lends itself to study of the impact of sustained 
innovation through product development on 
market structure. 
Data for this study were collected from archival 
sources and during field trips in Japan and the 
United States. Japan and the United States were 
chosen because firms from both countries produce 
well over 90 percent of the DRAM devices sold in 
the world market [lo]. Both the archival and inter- 
view data were collected between 1984 and 1990. 
It should be noted that only firms from the 
“merchant” portion of the DRAM market were 
used. These firms comprise about 92 percent of 
the entire production of DRAM devices. In 1990 
this amounted to $7.15 billion [25a]. Merchant 
firms are those that produce and sell the DRAM 
product to other firms. Firms, such as IBM, that 
produce the DRAM device, but do not sell it to 
other firms are known as “captive” suppliers and 
were excluded from this study. The total number 
of firms that were studied was 22. This number 
varied somewhat throughout the time period of 
the study because some firms exited and other 




A technological innovation was determined by 
a change in the capacity of the DRAM device to 
store information. This capacity was measured by 
the density or number of bits of information that 
can be stored in the memory device. Using this 
definition, there have been four product innova- 
tions, or changes in device type, in the DRAM 
during the period of study. The base is the 4 K 
DRAM and innovations occurred with the intro- 
duction of the 16 K DRAM. 64 K DRAM, 256 K 
DRAM. 1 Mb DRAM and 4 Mb DRAM. For this 
product, “K” represents 1000 bits, and “Mb” 
represents l,OOO,OOO bits. From this progression of 
innovations, the DRAM product traces a technol- 
ogy trajectory from the 4 K through the 16 K, 64 
K, 256 K. 1 Mb and the 4 Mb devices. 
Financml resource needs 
The financial resources were measured by the 
initial average offering price of each device, and 
by the level of investment needed to enter the 
integrated circuit industry. Both of these measures 
are tied directly to improvements in DRAM prod- 
uct technology. As such these measures should 
provide a more accurate representation of the cost 
of innovating in this technology than would re- 
search and development or capitalization figures 
which represent expenditures for the industry as a 
whole. 
Informational resource needs 
Archival data on the use of informational re- 
sources is not available. Therefore, a surrogate 
measure was used to indicate the level of informa- 
tion resource use associated with each DRAM 
device. In the IC industry it is customary to cir- 
culate to potential customers, samples of in- 
tegrated circuit devices that are new. These are 
samples of the prototype design of the new device 
or chip and are available in very limited quantity. 
There exists an interval of time between when the 
chips are first “sampled” and when they are avail- 
able at “significant” production levels. “Sampling 
time” reflects the efforts necessary to “de-bug” 
the production of the initial product design based 
on customer feedback. Because of the relative 
simplicity of designing a new DRAM device com- 
pared to “ramping up” production, the sampling 
time is a good surrogate for information resource 
needed to move from prototype to a mass pro- 
duced product. 
To be conservative in this analysis, the “signifi- 
cant” level of production was chosen to be 40,000 
units per quarter. This is a small quantity. and the 
importance of the demand factor is thus mini- 
mized. The difference between the quarter in which 
initial samples were sent to customers and the 
quarter when shipment was greater than 40,000 
units was then calculated; this is called the sam- 
pling time. The average sampling time was de- 
termined for each DRAM device type by averag- 
ing the sampling time across all the firms that 
introduced the device. The differences in these 
averages were then calculated for all the firms in 
the DRAM market. 
Firm size 
A measure of firm size used by Nelson and 
Winter 1341 in their study of innovation is market 
share. For this study, therefore. market share, as 
measured by sales revenue in the overall in- 
tegrated circuit industry in the firm’s home market, 
was used to determine the firm’s rank. Use of the 
home market data was necessary because Japanese 
firms only became significant suppliers of DRAMS 
after the 64 K device was introduced. Therefore, 
only domestic sales figures were available for 
Japanese firms through the 64 K device. In order 
to maintain consistency, this method of calculat- 
mg firm rank based on home market sales was 
applied throughout all the DRAM innovations. 
The rank of the firm in terms of home market 
share at the time it entered the market for each 
DRAM device type was used m the analysis. 
Again, it should be noted that only firms from the 
“merchant” portion of the DRAM market were 
used. 
Market structure 
The market structure was measured by a con- 
centration ratio for firms producing the device. 
The degree of concentration was defined by the 
Herfindahl index [18a]. the sum of the squared 
shares of each firm in the market. While only one 
measure of market structure was applied to the 
DRAM market, it is considered the best of the 
well known measures of concentration and theo- 
retically superior to the four firm ratio which is 
often used because of ease of computation [18a]. 
Further. the Herfindahl index is a measure of 
market structure and not market performance and 
should therefore provide a clearer picture of the 
changes that occur with a change in technology 
[21, p. 511. 
Number and rnnovation contmurty of firms 
The ma~mum number of firms that adopt an 
innovation is one measure of diffusion. This mea- 
sure of diffusion was calculated for each type of 
device; that is, the 4 K through 4 Mb markets. In 
the 4 Mb market, the maximum number of firms 
was for the year 1988, the most recent time for 
which data were available. 
With each innovation in the DRAM product 
firms that produced that device were noted. In- 
novation continuity of firms was defined as the 
period over which a firm was innovating, produc- 
ing and selling each of the devices. For a firm to 
be considered a part of the DRAM market. it is 
not sufficient for the firm to be producing pre- 
vious generations of DRAM devices. It must also 
be innovating and producing the most recent type 
of DRAM. The length of time that a firm was 
considered a part of the DRAM market was de- 
termined by the device type it entered on, such as 
4 K, 16 K and so on, and if appropriate, the 
device type it exited on. Consequently, the con- 
tinuity for a firm was measured by the firm’s 
presence in a particular DRAM device type. 
Results 
Maturation in the DRAM product / technology 
Within the evolutionary framework, it is im- 
portant that the technology be mature, in order 
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for it to exhibit the characteristics that are sum- 
marized in the propositions. The DRAM technol- 
ogy is maturing. Of the various integrated circuit 
devices produced by firms in the IC industry, it is 
one of the oldest. The very first DRAM was 
introduced in the early 1970s. While new devices 
are still being introduced, the rate of innovation, a 
measure of technological maturity, is decreasing. 
While the IC technology has continued to pro- 
gress through a number of innovations, the rate of 
innovation, as measured by the rate of density 
increase, has decreased since the 1960s. During 
the 1960s the rate was about 100 percent per 
annum. Coincidental with the introduction of the 
first DRAM, this rate dropped to between 50 
percent and 60 percent per annum in the 1970s 
and is expected to decrease to 25 percent per 
annum in the late 1980s and 1990s [25]. Conse- 
quently, the DRAM has matured as it has pro- 
gressed along its technological trajectory. 
Test of Proposition One: Financial resource needs 
As the DRAM device technology progressed 
along its technological trajectory and matured, the 
level of financial resources necessary for each de- 
vice is expected to increase. This is reflected in 
table 1. In the table, the initial average selling 
price of each device is displayed. This price is the 
price at the time of introduction of the device, 
before learning curve economies within each de- 
vice have set in. The price is a reflection of the 
capital and research and development expenses 
needed to bring the device into production. 
A significant break occurs between the Large 
Scale Integration (LSI) production techniques (4 
K and 16 K devices) and the Very Large Scale 
Integration (VLSI) production techniques (64 K, 
Table 1 
Imtial average selling price for each DRAM device 
Year DRAM 
device 
Technology Average selling 
price (dollars in 
year introduced) 
1974 4 K LSI $40.00 
1976 16 K LSI $60.00 
1978 64 K VLSI $200.00 
1980 256 K VLSI $200.00 
1985 1 Mb VLSI $150.00 
1988 4Mb ULSI $452.00 
Source: Dataquest [lo]. 
Table 2 
Estimated investment necessary for entry mto the United States 
mtegrated circuit market 
Year Investment 
(million dollars 










Sources: Tilton [51a], ICE, various issues 1977-1989. 
256 K, and 1 Mb devices). The differences within 
the LSI and VLSI groups are not great, but be- 
tween the LSI and VLSI groups a large difference 
is observed. While the initial price for the 1 Mb 
device is lower than its VLSI companion devices, 
it is still more than double the price of the 16 K 
LSI device. Another significant break appears with 
the 4 Mb device. This is the beginning of the Ultra 
Large Scale Integration (ULSI) devices, which in- 
cludes the yet to be marketed 16 Mb device, and 
the yet to be developed 64 Mb device. 
A similar pattern emerges from the financial 
investment needed to produce these devices. As 
noted in table 2, the initial investment necessary 
for entry has risen from about 20 million dollars 
in 1980 to 60 million dollars in 1984 and to 100 
million dollars in 1987. In 1989 the cost of estab- 
lishing a state-of-the-art fabrication facility was 
estimated to be $250 million and the projections 
are that by 1993 it will cost over $750 million. It is 
evident from these two tables that the financial 
resources needed for continued innovation in the 
DRAM segment of the integrated circuit industry 
is increasing. 
Test of Proposition One: Information resource needs 
As the DRAM device technology has matured, 
information resources also increased. The division 
between LSI and VLSI that was seen with the 
financial resources, was used in the analyses of the 
information resources. As seen in table 3, the 
average sampling times are increasing as the in- 
novations move from the LSI to the VLSI devices. 
IX 
Table 3 
Mean samplmg time, ANOVA and T-test for informational resources for the DRAM market 
Estimate of means 
Samphng time 
(quarter years) 
Analyst\ of variance 
source 
Device category 
Estimate of means 
Samphng time 
(quarter years) 
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An ANOVA indicated that the difference in means 
was statistically significant. 
This analysis was repeated for each of the de- 
vice types, 4 K, 16 K, 64 K, 256 K and 1 Mb 
DRAM. This was done in order to provide a more 
detailed examination of the changes in informa- 
tion resources. Again. the average sampling time 
increases from the 4 K to the 64 K. Although 
there is a decline with the 256 K device the 
upward trend continues with the 1 Mb device. An 
analysis of variance test applied to the data for the 
4 K through the 1 Mb device shows similar results 
to those found in testing the differences between 
LSI and VLSI categories: that is, the differences 
in the mean sampling time are statistically signifi- 
cant. Having examined the relationship between 
both resource needs and innovation. and having 
shown that these increase as predicted by Proposi- 
tion One, the effect of these changes on market 
structure and firm size will now be explored. 
Test of Proposltlon Two: Fwrn size 
The data on firm size is presented in table 4. 
The first three entrants into each device market is 
displayed in the table. In the case of ties, where 
more than one firm introduced the device at the 
same time, they are grouped together and share 
the same entrant position. 
From the table. it can be seen that relatively 
small firms dominated in the LSI era, 4 K and 16 
K DRAM devices. The first firms to enter, or 
“prime movers”, were not in the largest market 
Table 4 
Comparison of entry order with firm size and entry date for 
United States and Japanese firms m the DRAM market ’ 






































A Figures in parentheses represent the rank of the firm in terms 
of home country market share 
Sources: Dataquest (9a]: Integrated Circuit Engineermg. 1974- 
19X9. 
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share positions. It should be noted that the firms 
innovating in the LSI period were entrepreneurial 
start ups. As seen in the table, two U.S. firms, 
Intel and Mostek were archetypical entrepre- 
neurial start up firms at the time of the introduc- 
tion of those early devices. 
From the table it can also be observed that 
firms which were “prime movers”, in one product 
generation, such as the 16 K DRAM device type, 
were not able to translate this advantage to suc- 
ceeding generations of the DRAM, such as the 64 
K and 256 K. First to market with one new 
product innovation does not guarantee first to 
market status in succeeding product generations. 
Further, as the DRAM product/ technology ma- 
tured, and entered the VLSI era, the 64 K, 256 K 
and 1 Mb devices, a major change can be observed 
from the table. 
As predicted in Proposition Two, large firms 
did begin to dominate the market. Both Intel and 
Mostek had dropped out of the DRAM product 
market completely by the time of the introduction 
of the 1 Mb DRAM device. The trend began in 
the 64 K device market with Fujitsu, Texas Instru- 
ments and Motorola being the innovators. This 
trend becomes more pronounced in the 256 K and 
1 Mb markets where large firms have clearly 
established their innovative role. It is continuing 
with the 4 Mb device market. However, one firm, 
Oki, is quite small in market share terms relative 
to other Japanese IC producers. Overall this trend 
is in accord with Proposition Two and tends to 
lend credence to the argument that large firms 
have an advantage in innovation in response to 
increasing resource needs. The impact of the in- 
crease in firm size on market structure will be 
examined in the next section. 
Test of Proposition Three: Market structure and the 
diffusion process 
The Herfindahl index was computed for the 
overall sample and for each quarter for which data 
was available. The time interval was from the first 
quarter of 1974 until the last quarter of 1988. The 
Herfindahl index for the DRAM market is dis- 
played in fig. 1. The most striking feature of the 
figure is that the market concentration decreases 
over time. This is not in accord with Proposition 
Three. It is also a counter-intuitive result, given 
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Fig. 1. Level of cOncentratlOn for US and Japaneae producer5 
of DRAM dewces as measured by the Herfindahl mdex 1973- 
1988. 
This contradiction between larger firms in a less 
concentrated market will be examined in a later 
section. 
Test of Proposition Four: Maxlmum number of 
firms in each device market 
Data on the maximum number of firms in each 
device market is presented in table 5. The data 
presented is for the 4 K, 16 K, 64 K, 256 K 
devices and 1 Mb devices. The 4 Mb device is 
included, but results for this device are still con- 
sidered preliminary because it is still in the early 
years of introduction. 
As is evident from the table, the number of 
firms for the total DRAM device market became 
constant at seventeen firms after the 16 K device 
and continued at this number through the 256 K 
device. The number of firms that have entered the 
1 Mb device market is fourteen as of 1989. Thus 
overall, the pool of potential adopters is stabiliz- 
ing. Further, it is stabilizing at a number that is 
Table 5 
Maximum number of firms partlclpatmg m each DRAM 
market 
Deuce Total Umted States Japanese 
firms firms fnms 
4K 13 10 3 
16 K 17 11 6 
64 K 17 9 8 
256 K 17 9 8 
1 Mb 14 4 10 
Source: Dataquest [lo]. 
far smaller than the total number of firms that are Test of Propositcon Five: Contcnulty of firms be- 
in the integrated circuit industry. tween device rnnovations 
Part of the explanation for this limited diffu- 
sion of the DRAM technology to other firms in 
the IC industry can be found in the fact that as 
the DRAM technology matured, firms that were 
unable to acquire the necessary resources to com- 
mit to DRAM innovation, did not enter. Firms 
which had entered but could not maintain the 
necessary resource commitment for further in- 
novation, exited from the DRAM segment of the 
IC industry. Consequently. the number of firms 
innovating and producing DRAM devices has 
stabilized and appears to be falling with the 1 Mb 
device. Thus. Proposition Four is supported by the 
data presented. 
These findings offer only part of the picture of 
the diffusion process, however. In order to gain a 
better understanding of the dynamics of adoption 
it is important to examine the continuity of the 
firms. 
Information concerning innovation continuity 
is supplied in fig. 2. The existence of strong con- 
tinuity among the firms would indicate that bar- 
riers to entry exist through first mover advantages. 
These barriers would slow the diffusion process. 
From the figure it is evident that both entry as 
well as exit have occurred throughout the life cycle 
of the DRAM technology. Ten firms have entered 
the merchant end of the DRAM IC industry. Nine 
firms have exited from the merchant IC industry. 
Two firms have exited and re-entered. These are 
indicated by the broken lines for Intel and 
Motorola. ATT is still producing the 1 Mb DRAM 
but is not selling it in the merchant market. 
Additional firms have entered with each new 
device type. Three firms entered in the 16 K, two 
in the 64 K, three in the 256 K and two in the 1 
Mb device market. It should be noted that in the 























Frg. 2. Continuity among firms producing DRAM devxes. 
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64 K, 256 K and 1 Mb devices one of the entering 
firms, has been an entrepreneurial start up firm. 
Micron, in the 64 K, Vitelic in the 256 K and a 
venture start up, albeit a well financed venture 
firm from Japan, NMB, in the 1 Mb device have 
each innovated these VLSI devices. As of the first 
quarter of 1990. no new entrants have emerged in 
the 4 Mb device market. The existence of entry 
into the DRAM technology is not in accord with 
the strict technological primacy of the evolu- 
tionary economists. However, the findings do pro- 
vide some insight into the decrease in market 
concentration. As new firms enter with each in- 
novation in the DRAM technology, the market is 
divided among more firms. 
To summarize the findings thus far, the evolu- 
tionary economic framework has received partial 
support from the data presented and analyses 
performed. Both the information and financial 
resources were found to increase with succeeding 
innovations in accordance with Proposition One. 
Consequently. as predicted by Proposition Two 
the size of the innovating firms increased with the 
movement from LSI to VLSI. However, the level 
of market concentration has continually decreased 
contrary to Proposition Three. Thus, the findings 
on industrial structure are mixed. Consequently, 
the findings concerning the diffusion of innova- 
tion are also mixed. From Proposition Four, the 
maximum number of firms was shown to increase 
from the 4 K to 16 K and then to stabilize for the 
64 K and 256 K product markets. This number 
has declined in the 1 Mb product market. As the 
DRAM technology has undergone continuous in- 
novation in its products, the industry is coalescing 
around a core group of companies in accordance 
with Proposition Five, but barriers to entry and 
exit are not yet strong enough to preclude move- 
ment into or out of the DRAM market. 
Further analysis of demand factors 
The mixed findings on industrial structure raise 
some questions concerning the extent to which the 
DRAM market structure is driven strictly by tech- 
nological change in the DRAM technology itself. 
Why are firms entering the DRAM product 
market, when the resources required to continue 
innovation increase with each new product intro- 
duction? Why has the market concentration con- 
10000 1OOOM 1ooo000 1 OMMOO 10ooo0000 
auantity 
Fig. 3. Price and quantity shift under sustained Innovation in 
the DRAM market. 
tinued to decline throughout the life of the DRAM 
technology, even though the maximum number of 
firms has dropped in the 1 Mb device market? To 
answer these questions, additional analyses were 
performed on changes in demand for the DRAM 
device. 
DRAM market expansion and technological sophis- 
tication 
One possible explanation for the conflicting 
results between firm size and market concentra- 
tion would be that the demand for the product has 
increased over time. Firms could become larger 
without the market becoming more concentrated. 
Measuring the demand curve of a product is em- 
pirically very difficult. However, a useful surro- 
gate does exist. From the data collected for each 
device, the price and quantity combinations are 
known. If the quantity from device to device can 
be shown to increase with the price held constant, 
then the market can be shown to be expanding. 
This data is presented in fig. 3. 
From the figure it is readily apparent that the 
market is expanding. since the demand curves 
shift outward with each device type. In order to 
understand the precise magnitude of these shift it 
is useful to compare price and quantity combina- 
tions. The price and quantity combinations for 
each device are not perfectly matched, but com- 
parisons can be made. 
One price will be chosen and comparisons of 
the quantities demanded at that price will be 
enumerated. A price of $17.00 per unit is the best 
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candidate for comparisons across all the device 
types. For the 4 K device, the quantity demanded 
in the market at $17.00 per unit was 615.000. The 
quantity increased to 2,008,OOO for the 16 K and 
to 12,631,OOO for the 64 K. There were similar 
increases for the 256 K and 1 Mb devices with 
37.980.000 and 211.633.000 DRAM units de- 
manded at the chosen price. Thus, shifts of the 
supply and demands curves are occurring as well 
as movement along them. Hence, it is possible for 
firms to grow larger without pushing other firms 
out of the market since the market is expanding. 
This expansion in the market is related to the 
increasing capacity of the DRAM device for mem- 
ory storage. This has made each succeeding in- 
novation in the DRAM technology more appeal- 
ing to users of IC memory technology. As a result, 
the number of types of applications have in- 
creased, causing, in turn, an increase in the num- 
ber of DRAM users. 
As can be seen in table 6, with each new 
DRAM product innovation the number of appli- 
cations has increased. Applications for the DRAM 
began primarily with mainframe computers. This 
application has continued to expand as the types 
of computers, such as personal computers, have 
grown in number and these computers have been 
used m a wider variety of industrial and commer- 
cial settings. Further. there is a growing number of 
consumer applications, such as VCRs and the 
development of HDTV. This shift in applications 
for the DRAM has had broad implications for the 
producers of the DRAM device. It is the techno- 
logical improvements in the DRAM device which 
have caused the increase in the number of applica- 
tions. and this, in turn has resulted in the shift 
outward of the demand curves for each DRAM 
device type. 
Discussion 
Implications for firms 
From the above analyses it can be seen that 
sustained innovation does help to establish the 
strategic environment in which firms must com- 
pete. Three basic findings from this study provide 
an initial evaluation of the usefulness of the evolu- 
tionary framework in providing insights into how 
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ment. First, as suggested by the evolutionary 
school of thought. the need for resources for in- 
novation does increase as the technology matures. 
This could account for the emergence of large 
firms as innovators in the latter, VLSI portion of 
the DRAM device trajectory. The effect of this 
increase in resources is moderated by the growth 
of demand for the product. however. Growth in 
the demand for the DRAM was tied to the in- 
creasing variety of uses for the DRAM. which in 
turn is tied to the increasing memory storage 
capacity of the DRAM. It was this rapid growth 
in demand which allowed for the entry of new 
firms, and as a result the concentration ratio of 
the DRAM segment has decreased over time. It 
appears that sustained technological innovation 
D T. Methe! / Technologv and demand factors 23 
can be both a blessing and a curse for firms. At 
once increasing both the requisite resource level 
needed to innovate a product and the demand for 
each product innovation. 
Second, first movers did not necessarily have 
the advantage that is suggested by the evolu- 
tionary school of thought. While first mover ad- 
vantages were enjoyed within each DRAM prod- 
uct innovation, that was not the case between the 
innovations. Each new innovation provided a 
“window of opportunity” for a firm lagging in the 
current product generation to attempt to gain on 
the leading firm and overtake it with the innova- 
tion of the next product generation. Although 
some form of Schumpeterian competition was 
found to occur, the monopoly rents derived from 
such competition were low across the DRAM 
product innovation categories. Under conditions 
of sustained innovation in the DRAM technology, 
there was a crowding of firms into the first three 
entry positions. This suggests that the usual defini- 
tion of “prime mover” may be too narrow if it 
applies only to the first firm to enter with an 
innovation. 
Both the first and second findings have impli- 
cations for the debate concerning firm size and 
innovativeness most recently raised by Ferguson 
and Gilder [ 15,181. Although large firms have come 
to dominate the DRAM segment of the IC in- 
dustry, many of these firms have grown large 
because they have stayed in the DRAM segment 
and continued to innovate. Also, firms are con- 
tinuing to enter the DRAM segment: two were 
entrepreneurial start up firms from the U.S. and 
one from Japan. All entered during the VLSI era, 
which was shown to require more resources than 
the LSI era for innovation. Further. while large 
firms have become the innovators, they were not 
able to maintain their prime mover lead from 
innovation to innovation. These findings tend to 
present a more complicated picture of firm size 
and innovativeness than presented either by 
Ferguson or Gilder. 
The third finding concerns the effect of sus- 
tained innovation on diffusion. The diffusion curve 
for the DRAM technology did not follow the 
smooth S-curve pattern. In spite of expanding 
demand for the DRAM product, the number of 
firms adopting the various DRAM innovations 
was far short of the total number of firms in the 
integrated circuit industry. The increasing techno- 
logical cost of entry as exhibited by increases in 
the financial and information resources limited 
the number of potential adopters of the DRAM. 
The rate of adoption did not follow the standard 
sigmoidal pattern of increasing up to the 50 per- 
cent point and then decreasing. 
As seen from fig. 2. even viewing diffusion 
from the perspective of those firms most likely to 
“adopt” a new DRAM innovation - that is, those 
firms that had produced the previous innovation - 
many failed to do so. It even appears that a 
“shake out” occurred within the 1 Mb product 
category. While the demand curve has continued 
to shift outward, a recession that occurred in the 
IC industry at the same time as the introduction 
of the 1 Mb device, caused a number of DRAM 
producers from the U.S. side to exit. Although 
some of these firms have re-entered under various 
forms of licensing agreements from Japanese firms, 
in terms of the firms producing the DRAM in- 
novations, the results favor the interpretation that 
the diffusion curve has not followed an S-shaped 
pattern. 
In summary, sustained technological innova- 
tion was found to result in increased financial and 
information resources. Large firms were more able 
to sustain the innovative momentum necessary to 
remain in the DRAM market, but not at the total 
exclusion of small firms. The results concerning 
sustained technological innovation and market 
structure were more complicated. Increases or de- 
creases in demand were also found to effect both 
firm entry, exit and market concentration. From 
the findings derived from the DRAM industry. it 
would appear that demand factors cannot be 
ignored even in an industry characterized by sus- 
tained technological innovation. 
Future research 
This study is not a complete test of the evolu- 
tionary framework. but it does offer some insights 
into the evolutionary economic framework based 
on empirically derived data. These insights are 
particularly important as firms in industries other 
than the integrated circuit industry attempt to use 
fast product development cycles as a competitive 
strategy. Clarification of first mover advantages 
when demand and technology factors are inter- 
acting needs further research. Research into this 
area will also help to explain more fully the debate 





those favoring large firms and those 
small firms as innovators. 
this study examined an important prod- 
DRAM, it provides a base for further 
empirical examination of the interaction of de- 
mand and technology factors in an industrial set- 
ting. It points to the importance of and need for 
more longitudinal or time series studies of prod- 
ucts and technologies in other industrial settings. 
Hence, another fruitful area for future research 
would be to examine the evolutionary framework 
in other industries that are characterized by sus- 
tained product innovation. Such work would also 
lead to a more comprehensive and complete test 














Wdliam J. Abernathy and James M. Utterback. Patterns 
of Industrial InnovatIon. m: A.L Tushman and W.L. 
Moore (eds), Reudmgs m the Management of Innovation 
(PItman Pubhshmg, Inc.. Marshfield. MA, 1982) pp. 
97-108 
Wllham J. Abernathy and Kenneth Wayne, Lirmts of the 
Learmng Curve. m: M.L. Tushman and W.L. Moore 
(eds). Readmgs rn the Management of InnovatIon (Pitman 
Publishmg, Inc.. Marshfleld. MA. 1982) pp. 109-121. 
Robert U. Ayers. The Next Indusrrral Revolt&on. Revrv- 
mg Industy Through InnovatIon (Ballinger Pubhshing 
Co.. Cambndge. MA, 1984). 
B.A. Asia, Consulting Group. The Japanese Semrconduc- 
for InduFIT 1981/1982 (B.A. Asia Ltd., Hong Kong. 
1982) 
Clifford Barney, Winds of Change Sweep the Industry. 
Electromcs 60 (7) (Apnl 2, 1987) 62-67. 
Frederick Betz. Managmg Technologb” Comperrng 
Through New Ventures. Innovalron and Corporate Re- 
search (Prentice-Hall, Inc.. Englewood Chffs. NJ. 1987). 
Richard E. Caves and Masu Uekusa. Industrial Orgam- 
-ation rn Japan (The Brookmgs Instltutlon. Washington. 
D C.. 1976). 
Kim B. Clark, The Interaction of Design Hierarchies and 
Market Concepts m Technological Evolution. Research 
Pohcy 14 (1985) 235-251 
Arnold C Cooper and Dan Schendel, Strategic Re- 
sponses to Technology Threats, Busmess Hoxons 
(February 1976) 61-69 
Dataquest, Inc., MOS Static and D.warmc RAM Ship- 
merits, Second Half 1983 - Year-end Revrew (Dataquest 
Inc.. San Jo&, Ca, 15 May 1984). 
Dataquest, Inc., MOS Slatlc and D.vnarmc RAM Shrp- 
merits. Second Half 1989 - Year-end Rewew (Dataquest 
Inc.. San Jo&, CA, 15 May 1989). 
De& &ki Shijo Chosa Kaihen, Denshl ShrJo Yoran 




















Dodwrll Marketing Consultants, Indusrrlul Groupmgs m 
Japan /9X6/1987 (Dodwell Marketmg Consultants, 
Tokyo. Japan. 1986). 
M.H. Eklund and W.I. Strauss (eds). Srcrtu, 1982. A 
Report on the lnregrured Cwculr Indusrr, (Integrated Clr- 
cult Engmeermg Corporation. Scottsdale, AZ. 1982) 
M H Eklund and W.I. Strauss (eds). Status 1983 .4 
Report on rhe Integrated Cn-curt Industq’(Integrated Clr- 
cult Engmeering Corporation. Scottsdale. AZ. 1984) 
Charles H. Ferguson. From the People Who Brought 
You Voodoo Economics. Harcwrd Buwnesc Revleu 
(May-June 1988) 55-62. 
Therese M. Flaherty. Market Share, Technology Lrader- 
ship and Competition m International Senuconductor 
Markets. m: Richard S Rosenbloom (ed.). Research on 
Technological Innovation, Management and Pohcy Vol 1 
(JAI Press. Inc., London, 1983). 
Fortune. The 500 Largest Industrial Corporations, For- 
rune (New York. 28 April. 1986) 
George Gilder, The Revltahzatlon of Everythmg The 
Law of the Microcosm. Harvard Busmess Revlen, 
(March-April 1988) 49-61 
John C Hanse. The Measurement of Concentrated In- 
dustrlal Structure and the Size Distribution of Fwms. 
Annalc of Ecnomrc and Social Measurement 6(l) (Wmter 
1977). 73-107 
Nlco Hazewndus wth John Tooker. The US Mlcroelec- 
tromcs Indmt?. Technrcal Change. Indust? Growth and 
Social Impact (Pergamon Press. New York, 1982). 
Japan Electronics Industry Assoaatlon. Shwekl Karro 
Gwdo Bukku (Japan Electromcs Industry Association, 
1984). 
Morton I. Kamien and Nancy L. Schwartz, Market 
Structure and InnovatIon (Cambndge University Press. 
Cambridge. U.K.. 1982). 
Burton H. Klein. Prrces. Wages. and Busmess Cycles. A 
Dynamrc Theov (Pergamon, New York, 1984). 
Sven B. Lundstedt and E. William Colglauer. Jr.. 
Managmg InnovatIon: The Socral Dlmenslon of Creatwiy. 
Invention and Technoloa (Pergamon Press, New York. 
1982). 
William J. McClean (ed.). Status 1985: A Report on the 
Integrated Cwcult Industcbj (Integrated Circuit Engmeer- 
ing Corp.. Scottsdale, AZ. 1985). 
William J. McClean (ed.). Status 1986 A Report on the 
Integrated Cwcult IndusrT (Integrated Circmt Engineer- 
ing Corp., Scottsdale. AZ, 1986). 
William J. McClean (ed.). Status 1989. A Report on the 
Integrated Cwcult Industy (Integrated Circmt Engmeer- 
mg Corp.. Scottsdale. AZ. 1989). 
William J. McClean (ed.). Starus 1990. A Report on the 
Intergrated Cwcul! Indusf~ (Intergated Circuit Engmeer- 
ing Corp.. Scottsdale, AZ, 1990). 
Dems J. MC Grelvy and Kenneth A. Pxkar. VLSI Tech- 
noiogres Through the 80’s and Beyond (Institute of Elec- 
tncal and Electronic Engmeers. Inc., New York. 1982). 
David T. MethC. Technology, Transacllon Costs, and the 
Dlffuslon of InnovatIon. The Evolutron of the Unrted Stares 
and Japanese DRAM Integrated Cwcurt Industrres (Uni- 
versity of California, Irvine, unpublished dissertation. 
1985). 















David T. MethC. Innovation. Institutions and Strategies. 
The Evolution of the United States and Japanese Firms 
m the DRAM Industry. Strategic Management Society. 
Sixth Annual Conference, Singapore, October, 1986. 
Ashoka Mody and David Wheeler, Technological Evolu- 
tion of the Semiconductor Industry, Technologtcal Fore- 
castmg and Socral Change 30 (1986) 197-205 
William L. Moore and Michael L. Tushman, Managing 
Over the Product Life Cycle, in: Michael L. Tushman 
and William L. Moore (eds), Readings tn the Manage- 
ment of Innooatron (Pitman Publishing, Inc. Marshfield. 
MA, 1982). 
D.C. Mueller and J.E. Tilton, Research and Develop- 
ment Costs as Barriers to Entry. Canadran Journal of 
Economrcs (4) (November 1969) 570-579. 
Rtchard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Wmter, In Search of 
Useful Theory of Innovation, Research Polt~~~ 6 (1977) 
36-76. 
Rtchard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter. Forces Gener- 
ating and Limiting Concentration Under Schumpetenan 
Competition, Bell Journal of Economtcs (2) (Autumn 
1978) 524-548. 
Rtchard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, An Euolu- 
tronap Theon’ of Economrc Change (The Belknap Press 
of the Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982). 
Nthon Kaihatsu Ginko, Chosa Bu. IC Sangyo ‘80 Nendai 
No Tembo Chosa (January. 1984). 
Nomura Research Institute, SEMI Japanese Semlconduc- 
tar Indurtcy Report (Semtconductor Equipment and 
Matenals Institute, Mountain View. CA, 1983). 
ILuJtro Nonaka, Tadao Kagono and Shion Sakamoto. 
Evoluttonary Strategy and Structure: A New Perspective 
on Japanese Management. Discussion Parer No. 111, 
Institute of Busmess Research, Hitotsubasm University, 
March, 1983. 
Almam Phillips. Technology and Market Structure: SrudJ 
of the AvcraJt Indwtr,, (D.C. Heath and Company. 
Lexington. MA. 1971) 
Michael E. Porter, Competrtrue Strategy: Techmques for 
Anu&tng Industnes and Competrtors (The Free Press. 
New York, 1980). 
Everett M. Rogers, D%fusron of Innouattons. Third Ed. 
(The Free Press, New York. 1983). 
Rtchard S. Rosenbloom (ed.), Research on Technologrcal 
Innouatron Management and Pokcv. Vol. 1 (JAI Press, 
Inc.. London, 1983) 
Vernon W. Ruttan and YuJtro Hayami. Toward a Theory 
of Induced Instttutional Innovation, Journal of Deoelop- 















Devendra Sahal. A Theory of Evolution of Technology. 
Internattonal Journal of Sysfems Sctence 10 (3) (1979) 
259-274. 
Devendra Sahal, Patterns of Technologrcal Innouatton 
(Addison-Wesley Pubhshmg Co., Inc., Readmg. MA. 
1981). 
Masaru Satto. Internal Transfer and Technology Trans- 
fer From Abroad: Japanese Experience. Workshop on 
Technology Transfer and Plan, Kuala Lumpur. Decem- 
ber, 1983. 
David E. Sanger, Trying to Regain the Market in Chips, 
The New York Times (8 March 1987) E 7. 
Brenton R. S&lender and Stephen Kreider Yoder, Fall- 
ing Chips: U.S.-Japanese Accord on Semiconductors 
Has an Impact, but Not the One That Was Hoped For, 
The Wall Street Journal (12 February 1987) pp. lo+. 
Joseph, A. Schumpeter. Burtness Cycles: A Theorettcal, 
Htstoncal and Statrsttcal Analysts of the Caprtaltst Process 
(McGraw-Hill, New York, 1939). 
Francis C. Spital. Gaming Market Share Advantage m 
the Semtconductor Industry by Lead Time in Innova- 
tion, m: Richard S. Rosenbloom (ed.). Research on Tech- 
nologtcal Innooatlon, Management and Poltcy. Vol. 1 (JAI 
Press, Inc.. London. 1983). 
David J. Teece, Economics of Scope and the Scope of the 
Enterprise, The Journal of Economrc Behavror and 
Organrzatron 30 (2 December 1981) 173-200. 
Hans B. Thorelh. Networks: Between Markets and 
Hterarchtes, Strategrc Management Journal (January- 
February 1986) 37-51. 
John E. Tilton. Internatronal Dtffturon of Technology. 
The Case of Semtconductors (The Brookings Institutton, 
Washington D.C., 1971). 
Michael L. Tushman and William L. Moore, Readmgs tn 
the Management of Innouatron (Pitman Pubhshing, Inc., 
Marshfield, MA. 1982). 
Eric von Hippel. The Dominant Role of Users m the 
Scientific Instrument Innovation Process, Research Policy 
5 (1976) 212-239. 
Robert W. Wilson. Peter K. Ashton and Thomas P 
Egan, Innooatron Competrtron, and Government Poltcy m 
the Semiconductor IndusT (D.C. Heath and Company. 
Lexington, MA. 1980) 
Yano Keizai Kenkyu Jo, I984 Handotar Sangyo no Chukr 
Juyo Tembo. (Yano Ketzai Kenkyu Jo. Tokyo, Japan, 
1984). 
